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COURT OV APPEALS, 1956 TERM
plaintiff by the defendant was the proceeds of an illegal act committed by the
plaintiff.
In affirmance of the lower tribunals4" this Court held, (6-1) that public
policy forbids recovery in the instant case.41 The settled law of this jurisdiction
is that one may not evoke the assistance of a court of law to permit him to
profit or take advantage of his own wrongdoing.
42
Hofferman v. Simmons43 cited by the majority and dissent, held that by
statute44 one who has wagered with a gambler never parts with title to the
money and thus having no tide to the money, gamblers may not replevin their
wagers.45 In the instant case the Court pointed out that while there was no such
statute covering the fact situation presently before them, it long has been settled
by public policy that courts should withhold their sanction to titles and
possessery rights fdunded only on law breaking. Answering the position taken
by the dissent that such withholding was equivalent to a confiscation, the majority
stressed they were by no means attempting to exact property without due process
of law in that the defense of illegality was allowed not for the protection of the
defendant but as a disability to the plaintiff.
46
Admissibility Of Evidence Of Adverse Reaction In Aid of General Damages
In Libel Actions
Macy v. New York World-Telegram Corporation,47 a libel action, was based
upon an article allegedly charging that plaintiff attempted to obtain nomination
as United States Senate candidate by threatening disclosure of a letter describing
certain questionable political transactions. Judgment for plaintiff at Trial Term
was affirmed by the Appelate Division48 and defendant appealed by permission
of the Court of Appeals which reversed and granted a new trial. The decisive
issue, over which the Court split (4-3), concerned the admissability of evidence
40. 126 N.Y.S.2d 7 (County Ct. 1956); 285 A.D.2d 968, 138 N.Y.S.2d 682
(2d Dep't 1956).
41. Flegenheimer v. Brogan, 284 N.Y. 268, 30 N.E.2d 591 (1940); Riggs v.
Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
42. Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 N.E.2d 571 (1948).
43. 290 N.Y. 449, 49 N.E.2d 523 (1943).
44. N.Y. PENAL LAW §994.
45. People v. Stedeker, 175 N.Y. 57, 67 N.E. 132 (1903).
46. Reiner v. North American Newspaper Alliance, 259 N.Y. 250, 181 N.E.
561 (1932).
47. 2 N.Y.2d 416, 161 N.Y.S2d 55 (1957).
48. Macy v. New York World-Telegram Corp., I A.D.2d 652, 147 N.Y.S.2d 677
(1955).
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as to damages.49 Plaintiff had alleged only general damages, but at the trial
was allowed to testify that, following publication of the alleged libel, he had
received derogatory letters, he had-been cartooned as a skunk, his membership
in a country club had been cancelled, members and leaders of Congress had
made derogatory remarks about him, and that the refusal of the House of
Representatives to seat him in 1951 was to some degree the result of the
alleged libel.
The problem, most generally, is whether the presumption of injury to
reputation as a basis for general damages may be supported by evidence tending
actually to prove such consequences, and if so, what restrictions are to be placed
on the types of evidence admissable for this purpose? A relatively early New
York case 50 eliminated the possibility of admission of opinions of third persons
as to the gravity of the alleged libel, on the ground that injection of such issues
would unduly complicate and prolong trials, and would enable a defendant to
defame another with impunity by showing that his own reputation was so low
or his victim's reputation so high that no one believed him.5 1 The question of
admissability of the type of evidence involved in the present case, evidence of
specific instances of aversion or contempt, was first considered in New York in
Bishop v. New York Times,5 2 where the court stated, "We are inclined to the
view that a plaintiff is not compelled to rely upon a favorable presumption with
which the law endows his cause of action but that he may prove if he can that
he has been avoided and shunned by former friends and acquaintances as the
direct and well-connected result of the libel." But the court there did not
squarely base its decision on this view, and the Court in the present case
considered it to be only a dictum. In a recent case,53 the Court of Appeals
indicated that it would accept this position, but it based its decision on other
grounds.
In the instant case, the Court indicated acceptance of the position stated in
Bishop v. New York Times but again refused to give it explicit recognition as
controlling law. The majority held that the testimony in question "even if not
inadmissable by its nature, was presented in such form and quantity as to violate
49. The Court also split on the admission into evidence of proof of a reprint
of part of the article in a small local newspaper, the majority holding the
admission to be error because it would allow the jury to charge against defendant
a separate libel, and the minority contending that since the reprint was offered
only to show the widespread publication of defendant's libel, Its admission could
not be held to constitute harmful error.
50. Linehan v. Nelson, 197 N.Y. 482, 90 N.E. 114 (1910).
51. This argument was rejected in Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d
897 (2d Cir. 1949) in which it was held that a fair sample of the effect upon
readers of the libel could be put before the jury by calling individual readers
and asking them what impresssion it left in their minds.
52. 233 N.Y. 446, 155 N.E. 906 (1922).
53. Julian v. American Business Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 155 N.Y.S.2d
1, 6 BUFFALO L. R-V. 224 (1956).
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the rights of defendant." Some of it was considered objectionable as pure hearsay,
as statement of conclusion not susceptible of proof, and as proof of special damages
not pleaded. But the overall ground for ruling it inadmissable was the lack of proof-
that these reactions were directly caused by the alleged libel. It was held that
even if the Bishop position were to be taken as law, this evidence of aversion
failed to meet its standards; the incidents were not sufficiently shown to be "the
direct and well-connected result of the libel." The Court was particularly concerned
with the inability of a defendant adequately to meet such testimony by a plaintiff
and suggested that testimony. by those persons supposed to have acted adversely
to plaintiff, and demonstration through such testimony of connection to the libel,
if such demonstration be possible, would be more acceptable because it would
afford defendant an adequate opportunity of cross examination.
In the dissent, evidence of aversion manifested as a consequence of libel
was held admissable to show general damages, a conclusion with which the
majority did not disagree. It is not clear whether the minority felt that the
incidents described by plaintiff had been sufficiently proven as direct results of
the alleged libel, or whether they felt that proof of direct causality was unnecessary
to allow such evidence. The admission of the evidence in question was considered
harmless, since it did not touch on the primary issue at the trial, and it was not
considered to have been adequately objected to.
Macy v. New York World-Telegram Corporation has to some extent clarified
the law as to the admissability of evidence to support the presumption of general
damage in libel actions. The Court was careful not to commit itself but made it
apparent that evidence of adverse reaction to plaintiff following the alleged libel
may be introduced if it is in the proper form. If the evidence of aversion is in
the form of testimony by those persons supposed to have manifested the
aversion and meets the usual rules of evidence, then it would probably be held
admissable. But if the examples of aversion are to be put before the jury by"
the testimony of plaintiff, then a clear showing of direct causal connection to
the alleged libel-would seem to be required for admission of the testimony
into evidence.
Admissibility Of Evidence Of Religious Faifh in Certain Libel Actions
In Toomey v. Farley,54 a libel action, defendants were respectively the
incumbent Democratic Party office holder and several members of his organization
who, during a primary campaign, published a political "newspaper" containing
statements allegedly to the effect that plaintiffs, who were an opposing candidate
and one of his workers respectively, were Communists or fellow travellers.
Verdict and judgment of the Trial Term were for plaintiffs. The Appellate
54. 2 N.Y.2d 71, 156 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1956).
